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The aim of this thesis is to develop an intrusion detection system (IDS) software, 
which learns to detect and classify network attacks and intrusions through prior training 
data. With the added criteria of operating in real-time applications, ways of improving the 
efficiency of the IDS without sacrificing the probability of correct classification (PCC) 
are also considered. Knowledge Data and Discovery Cup 99 data is used to evaluate the 
IDS architecture. Two neural network (NN) architectures were designed and compared 
through simulation; the first architecture uses a single NN, while the second uses the 
merged output of three NNs in parallel. Results show that a three-parallel NN 
implementation has similar classification performance and a shorter training time than 
with a single NN implementation. PCC is on the order of 93% for denial-of-service 
attacks and 96% for normal traffic. The classification results for the R2L and U2R attacks 
are poor due to the lack of available training data. 
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
1. Feature Extraction Background ...................................................3 
2. Classification Background ............................................................4 
B. PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTIONS ............................................................5 
C. THESIS OUTLINE ....................................................................................6 
II. THE NN-BASED IDS ............................................................................................7 
A. OVERVIEW OF PROCESS FLOW IN IDS...........................................7 
B. KNOWLEDGE AND DATA DISCOVERY (KDD) CUP 99 
DATA ........................................................................................................10 
C. RAW DATA PRE-PROCESSING .........................................................11 
D. FEATURE EXTRACTION ....................................................................12 
1. Removal of Features with Small Variations ..............................12 
2. Removal of Highly Correlated Features ....................................13 
E. NN IMPLEMENTATIONS ....................................................................13 
1. The Supervised Learning NN .....................................................13 
2. Single NN Classification Module ................................................17 
3. Three-Parallel NN Classification Module ..................................18 
III. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ...............................................21 
A. BASELINE CLASSIFIER WITHOUT FEATURE 
EXTRACTION ........................................................................................21 
1. Probability of Correct Classification Results ............................22 
2. Timing Results ..............................................................................22 
B. REDUCED FEATURE SIZE CLASSIFIER 
IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................................23 
1. Probability of Correct Classification Results ............................24 
2. Timing Results ..............................................................................24 
C. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS .................................................................25 
1. Feature Extraction Impacts on Training-Stage Execution 
Time ...............................................................................................25 
2. Comparison of NN Implementations .........................................25 
3. Effects of the Training Dataset ...................................................26 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................27 
 viii 
APPENDIX A. TYPES OF NETWORK ATTACKS FOR KDD CUP 
TRAINING DATA ...............................................................................................29 
APPENDIX B. FEATURES LIST FOR KDD CUP DATA .........................................31 
APPENDIX C. ENUMERATION USED FOR SYMBOLIC FEATURES ................33 
APPENDIX D. HISTOGRAM OF FEATURES PER OUTCOME TYPE ................37 
APPENDIX E. CONFUSION MATRIX RESULTS FOR BASELINE 
SCENARIO WITHOUT FEATURE EXTRACTION .....................................41 
APPENDIX F. CONFUSION MATRIX RESULTS FOR SCENARIO 
UTILIZING FEATURE EXTRACTION ..........................................................47 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................53 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................57 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The TCP/IP Internet model as described in [2]. ..........................................2 
Figure 2. Single NN-based IDS process flow. ............................................................8 
Figure 3. Three-parallel NN-based IDS process flow. ................................................9 
Figure 4. Flowchart of KDD cup 99 data processing prior to classification 
stage. ..........................................................................................................15 
Figure 5. Forty-one input pattern recognition feed-forward NN structure. ...............21 
Figure 6. Thirty-three input pattern recognition feed-forward NN structure. ...........23 
Figure 7. Features of KDD cup 99 data for dos attack; histogram of features 
values. ........................................................................................................37 
Figure 8. Features of KDD cup 99 data for u2r attack; histogram of features 
values. ........................................................................................................38 
Figure 9. Features of KDD cup 99 data for r2l attack; histogram of features 
values. ........................................................................................................38 
Figure 10. Features of KDD cup 99 data for probe attack; histogram of features 
values. ........................................................................................................39 
Figure 11. Features of KDD cup 99 data for normal; histogram of features 
values. ........................................................................................................39 
Figure 12. Confusion matrix for single NN – test dataset. ..........................................41 
Figure 13. Confusion matrix for sub NN #1 – test dataset. .........................................42 
Figure 14. Confusion matrix for sub NN #2 – test dataset. .........................................43 
Figure 15. Confusion matrix for sub NN #3 – test dataset. .........................................44 
Figure 16. Confusion matrix for merged output of three-parallel NN – test 
dataset. .......................................................................................................45 
Figure 17. Confusion matrix for single NN – test dataset. ..........................................47 
Figure 18. Confusion matrix for sub NN #1 – test dataset. .........................................48 
Figure 19. Confusion matrix for sub NN #2 – test dataset. .........................................49 
Figure 20. Confusion matrix for sub NN #3 – test dataset. .........................................50 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 Breakdown of outcome types in the KDD cup 99 training and test 
datasets. ......................................................................................................10 
 List of features used for the classification stage. .......................................14 
 PCC for baseline scenario on test dataset. .................................................22 
 NN training execution time (average over 30 Runs) – baseline 
scenario. .....................................................................................................23 
 PCC for reduced feature size classifier on test dataset. .............................24 
 NN training execution time (average over 30 runs) – reduced feature 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
KDD Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 
NN Neural Network 
PCC Probability of Correct Classification 
RAM Random Access Memory 
SVM Support Vector Machines 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
  
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
My sincere thanks go to Professor Phillip Pace and Professor Monique Fargues, 
who have provided me with ample learning opportunities through their patience, 
motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. Their valuable guidance has been 
instrumental in making this thesis possible. Special thanks to Dr. Martin Kruger, Office 
of Naval Research, ONR Code 30, Arlington, VA. 
 
 xvi 




Background into the development of an intrusion detection system software 
prototype and the principal contributions of this thesis are discussed in this thesis 
A. BACKGROUND 
The growing threat of malicious network activities and intrusion attempts makes 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) a necessity. Network traffic includes attacker packets, 
normal packets, and victim packets; thus, IDS must work in a dynamic environment and 
requires continuous tuning to react against the evolving new attacks that exploit newly 
discovered security weaknesses. Examples of network attacks include: 
• MAC layer denial-of-service (DOS) attacks 
• ChopChop attacks 
• Passive eavesdropping 
• Deauthentication attacks 
• Fragmentation attacks 
• Duration attacks 
• Probing (probe) 
• Remote-to-local (R2L) 
• User-to-root (U2R) 
Typical approaches to intrusion detection include anomaly detection, misuse 
detection, and combined anomaly/misuse detection [1]. Anomaly detection works by 
identifying unusual (often malicious) activities which differ from typical user patterns. 
Misuse detection compares and contrasts a user’s activities with known attackers’ 
behavior when attempting to access a network. The hybrid or combined approach uses a 
mix of anomaly and misuse detection.  
In the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) Internet model, 
there are typically four protocol layers used in the communication process between 
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computers within a network. A detailed description of the respective layers can be found 
in [2]. These layers are shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  The TCP/IP Internet model as described in [2]. 
 
Network data can be collected from any of these protocol layers by various 
monitoring techniques and then passed to the IDS for analysis and categorization. The 
IDS first extracts the relevant features of the network data to construct a feature vector; 
the network data are typically captured from the network TCP/IP header and lower level 
protocol frames. Further information about headers and protocol frames can be found in 
Part I of [2]. The feature vector is then processed by a nonlinear network to identify the 
presence of attack (unauthorized intrusion or misuse) or normal traffic. The results 
produced by the IDS may then be used by a management system to negate the attack and 
identify its source.  
Typically, the IDS handles a high-dimensionality input feature space, and the 
testing of the different feature-extraction and classification algorithms is often conducted  
using the KDD Cup 99 dataset [3]. This dataset was derived from the DARPA IDS 
evaluation dataset (1998) and has approximately “5 million connection records,” each 
representing a TCP/IP connection made up of 41 features. Each feature can either be 
qualitative or quantitative in nature.  
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In this thesis, the KDD Cup 99 data are enumerated, parsed and normalized to 
form a set of raw feature vectors used by the feature-extraction process. The feature-
extraction process then extracts relevant features to derive a processed feature vector as 
an input to the classifier. A nonlinear network then uses these feature vectors to detect 
and classify the intrusion types (DoS, Probe, U2R, R2L, unknown). The training dataset, 
which consists of a combination of feature vectors with their associated output types is 
used to globally train and compute the classifier parameters. The probability of correct 
classification (PCC) is evaluated using the test dataset. 
1. Feature Extraction Background 
Features used for training and testing of the IDS must retain the anomalies and 
misuse information critical to the performance of the classifier. Network traffic data may 
also contain redundant and irrelevant features that can overwhelm and disable the IDS. 
Consequently, the key goal of feature-extraction is to identify and remove irrelevant, 
inconsistent, and redundant features, reducing the feature vector size. Also important is to 
preserve the optimal features to characterize the network data (e.g., normal traffic or 
attack traffic) while simultaneously maintaining the classifier accuracy.  
A significant body of research exists on the process of feature-extraction. 
In [4], a hybrid model (wrapper model and filter models) was explored to select 
an optimal feature vector. The wrapper model “uses the predictive accuracy of the 
classifier” to evaluate the quality of the feature vector. The filter model uses the 
“information, consistency or distance measures” to determine the relevance of the feature 
vector. The two methods are then combined to select an optimal feature vector [4]. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) and independent component analysis (ICA) 
were explored in [5]. The PCA transforms a set of features to a lower dimensional space 
while retaining the variability of the original data; however, the use of PCA to handle 
dynamic changes in the behavior of the network data was not addressed. To handle such 
changes, a hybrid data mining technique using a dynamic principle component analysis 
(DPCA) and a latent semantic analysis (LSA) were combined in [6].  
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In [7], a feature selection algorithm based on “Mahalanobis distance feature 
ranking” was used with an exhaustive search to identify appropriate features for 
identifying each attack type.  
A feature selection approach based on a Bayesian network classifier was proposed 
in [8] and an optimal selection of features using genetic algorithm was presented in [9].  
In [10], genetic k-means clustering methods were used to detect unknown attack 
patterns and remove irrelevant features in order to derive a smaller feature set while 
giving a higher classification accuracy of attacks. 
A multivariate correlation detection system for DoS attack was presented in [11, 
12]. This technique was able to detect “known and unknown DoS attacks” by considering 
“triangle-area-based multivariate correlation analysis” and geometrical correlations 
between traffic patterns of legitimate network traffic. Another flooding-based DoS attack 
detection which uses a feature subset selection algorithm was discussed in [13]. 
In [14], a correlation-based feature extraction method was used to reduce the size 
of the input feature space through the use of a partial-decision tree that parses out normal 
and abnormal behaviors. The assumption is that a good feature set contains features that 
are only highly correlated with the respective outcome types. In [15], irrelevant features 
are removed from a “ranked feature list based on the mutual information between each 
feature and the decision variable.” The decision variable refers to the detection and 
classification of network attacks. 
2. Classification Background 
Typical IDS tools (for example, SNORT) use rule-based filter techniques, which 
must be manually configured by a network analyzer for the detection of network attacks; 
however; the large number of inputs and the complexity of relationships between inputs 
makes it difficult for the network analyzer to be manually programmed with a 
comprehensive set of rules.  
One possible IDS approach uses a nonlinear network to classify and identify the 
presence of a network attack (or normal traffic) as discussed in [16]. Specifically, Neural 
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Networks (NN) were found to be useful for IDS applications, where there is a need to 
differentiate between different types of network attacks. NNs are described in [17] as 
statistical and recursive learning models which “fit” a function based on a training dataset 
that has defined inputs and desired outputs; thus, NNs are suitable for tackling 
complicated problems which cannot be solved using rule-based or logic-based 
techniques. The large dimensionality of the network features makes the classification of 
network attacks complex and creates the case for the use of a NN.  
B. PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
An IDS software prototype was developed with the following design goals: 
• Handle known classes of attacks; 
• Handle unknown classes of attacks and classify accordingly; 
• Operate in near real-time to classify continuous network traffic; 
• Retrain based on new network data with minimal disruption to real-time 
operations. 
The Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) Cup 99 data was selected to 
test and numerically the IDS. The source of the KDD Cup 99 data is based on the NSL-
KDD dataset as described in [3]. A raw data preprocessing software module, as described 
in Section II.C, was developed to parse the raw training and testing network features into 
a usable format for the subsequent feature-extraction module. 
A feature-extraction software module, as described in Section II.D, was 
considered to reduce the network features, resulting in lower training times needed for the 
NN implementations.  
A classification software module, as described in Section II.E was developed to 
detect the intrusion using the feature vector output from the feature-extraction software 
module. The classification software module uses NNs for training and classification of 
different types of network attacks. In addition, the classification software module was 
developed to test two different NN implementations and their performance was compared 
in terms of the PCC and efficiency. 
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C. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter II, an overview of the process flow 
in the IDS and a description of each component of the IDS is detailed. In Chapter III, the 
results and implications of the IDS are discussed. Finally, conclusions and 
recommendations for future work are given in Chapter IV. 
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II. THE NN-BASED IDS 
The implementation and design considerations of the NN-based IDS is described 
in this thesis. 
A. OVERVIEW OF PROCESS FLOW IN IDS 
The IDS implementation was developed using MATLAB 2014b and is divided 
into three software modules: raw data pre-processing, feature extraction and 
classification. 
Each software module was designed to work independently with other modules, 
producing a set of output files used by the subsequent modules in the process flow. Any 
of the software modules in the process flow can be replaced provided the required inputs 
are available and in the correct format and syntax. With this built-in flexibility in mind, it 
is possible to adapt the raw data pre-processing module to allow the IDS to be trained 
with network traffic data other than the KDD Cup 99 dataset.  
For this thesis research, two different classification architectures were explored 
and compared in terms of accuracy and computing times. The first architecture utilized a 
single NN for the classification process and is illustrated as a block diagram shown in 
Figure 2.  The second architecture utilized three separate NNs for the classification 
process and is illustrated as a block diagram in Figure 3. This second structure was 
inspired by [18], where the training data was randomly separated into an arbitrary number 
of subsets for the purpose of temporal analysis of network traffic data, and each subset 
was used to train an individual classifier separately. In this thesis, the training data was 
split into three subsets, and each NN trains with each subset, respectively. The outputs 
from each of the three separate NNs were combined to produce the final output. Further 
details are provided in Section E. 
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Figure 3.  Three-parallel NN-based IDS process flow. 
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B. KNOWLEDGE AND DATA DISCOVERY (KDD) CUP 99 DATA 
The KDD Cup 99 data set was developed for use in the Third International 
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition. The dataset was created 
through a raw TCP data dump of a simulated U.S. Air Force local-area network (LAN), 
where the network was subjected to deliberate network attacks.  
Each training sample in the training dataset represents a connection summary, and 
there are a total of 25,192 samples in the training dataset. Each sample can be classified 
as one of the 22 training attack types and can be further categorized as one of the general 
five outcome types: DOS, U2R, R2L, Probe or Normal. Refer to Appendix A for the full 
list of outcome types, and a detailed description of each of the outcome types can be 
found in [3]. Each connection summary is described using 41 features as listed in 
Appendix B, which the NN classifier uses as inputs for both training and testing. 
In the test dataset, each sample is similarly a connection summary, and there are a 
total of 22,543 samples in the test dataset. In addition, there are 15 types of attacks which 
are not found in the training dataset. For the purpose of testing the ability of the IDS to 
handle unknown attack types, these 15 types of attacks are classified as unknown types in 
the performance evaluation phase.  
A breakdown of the number of outcome types for the testing and training dataset 
is shown in Table 1.   
 Breakdown of outcome types in the KDD cup 99 training and test 
datasets. 
Dataset Type Number of Samples per Outcome Type 
DOS U2R R2L Probe Normal Unknown 
Training 9234 11 209 2289 13449 0 
Testing 5651 37 2199 1106 9710 3750 
 
The KDD Cup 99 dataset was downloaded from a Git repository [19], which uses 
the NSL-KDD dataset. The NSL-KDD dataset, as discussed in [3], is a corrected version 
 11 
of KDD Cup 99 dataset, which addresses issues and problems in the original KDD Cup 
99 dataset.  
It must be noted that the KDD Cup 99 dataset is solely used for the purpose of 
developing the IDS software. It was noted by Brugger [20] that the KDD Cup 99 data is 
outdated and not fully representative of network traffic attacks; thus, there is a need for 
the IDS to be validated with updated and more representative network data in future 
projects. 
C. RAW DATA PRE-PROCESSING 
The raw data pre-processing stage takes the KDD Cup 99 training data and 
converts it into a matrix of representative numerical data for the feature-extraction and 
classification stage. This stage performs the pre-processing described in the following 
paragraphs. 
Transforming semantic features into enumeration allows subsequent stages to 
process these features as numerical values. In addition, the same set of conversion rules 
applies to both training and test dataset; thus, both training and test dataset must use the 
same set of semantics for the respective features. For the “protocol_type,” “service,” and 
“flag” fields, the enumerations used are shown in Appendix C. 
Normalizing features scales features in the range 0 to 1, preventing the training 
process from being affected by large variations in the feature values. 
Formatting raw data for MATLAB input saves the processed raw data in a 
suitable format for the feature-extraction and classification stage. For example, in this 
simulation setup, 25,192 training samples were in the raw data, each training sample has 
41 features, and each training sample has one of five possible general outcomes; thus, a 
single training data matrix that encompasses the features and outcomes for every one of 
the 25,192 training samples was produced as an output. 
Calculating mean, standard deviation, and histogram of features per outcome type 
provides data for the feature-extraction stage to determine if the feature is useful for 
classification. In this case, the software module calculates the mean and standard 
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deviation of each feature for each outcome type. For example, a 5-by-41 matrix is 
generated for the mean of the features per outcome type, where there are five outcome 
types and 41 features. In addition, the histogram of the feature values, for each feature per 
outcome type, is also created for visual analysis purposes. The histograms generated are 
shown in Appendix D. 
D. FEATURE EXTRACTION 
This software module uses the properties of each feature per outcome type to 
evaluate the features that are useful at the training stage. For this application, an array of 
1s and 0s is generated, where a value of 1 indicates to the classification stage that the 
respective feature is to be used for training, while a value of 0 means the opposite.  
The feature-extraction stage uses two methods to remove redundant or irrelevant 
features. 
1. Removal of Features with Small Variations  
The first filtering mechanism removes all features which remain relatively 
constant across different outcome types. For a feature to be considered “constant,” the 
conditions described in the following paragraphs must be satisfied. 
The mean of a feature is approximately the same for all outcome types. In such a 
case, the classification stage is not able to use this feature to differentiate between 
different outcome types during the training stage. The mean of the five outcome types are 
tabulated, and the standard deviation of the five means are then calculated. If this 
standard deviation is less than the empirical threshold value of 0.0001, the mean values of 
the five outcome types are considered to be similar. 
The standard deviation value of the feature is small for all outcome types. In such 
a case, features vary within a relatively small range, making this feature useless for 
training purposes. The standard deviation of the five outcome types are first tabulated. If 
all five standard deviation values are less than the empirical threshold value of 0.001, this 
means that the feature does not vary significantly for all outcome types. 
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2. Removal of Highly Correlated Features 
In this step, the correlation coefficient matrix of the features is calculated, and 
pairs of features which have a correlation coefficient value larger than or equal to 0.97 
are identified. For each pair of highly correlated features, only one of the features is 
selected for the feature vector and used at the classification stage. The correlation 
coefficient matrix is calculated by  
 ( , )( , )
( , ) ( , )
C i jR i j
C i i C j j
=   (1) 
where i  and j  represent one of the 41 features and ( , )C i j  is the corresponding 














  (2) 
where i  and j  represents the mean of the respective features and N  is the number of 










  (3) 
and j is also defined similarly. 
To summarize, a flow chart of the raw data pre-processing and feature-extraction 
processes for the KDD Cup 99 data before the classification stage is illustrated in Figure 
4, and the list of features used for the classification stage is shown in Table 2.  
E. NN IMPLEMENTATIONS 
1. The Supervised Learning NN 
The NN is a nonlinear process that is trained to perform a particular task 
(filtering, predicting, identifying patterns, etc.). In this thesis, the NN is implemented 
using the MATLAB software.   
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Figure 4.  Flowchart of KDD cup 99 data processing prior to classification stage. 
 
The NN consists of an interconnected network of basic computing blocks called 
neurons. Inter-neuron connections contain synaptic weights, and the synaptic weights are 
used to retain knowledge obtained through the training process. Through the training 
process, the synaptic weights are tuned to achieve the training objective. In the NN 
toolbox provided by MATLAB [21], training functions are defined explicitly as global 
algorithms for the synaptic weights tuning process. In addition to the training algorithm, 
the NN toolbox also allows the definition of post-processing algorithms to evaluate the 
network performance after the training process. A defined proportion of the training 
dataset also needs to be allocated for validation purposes in the training process, 
preventing overfitting of the NN to the training dataset. 
In this thesis, the NN type of interest is the multi-layer feedforward network. In 
such networks, the neurons are arranged in layers. The most basic form is the single-layer 
feedforward network, where the input source nodes directly project to a layer of output 
nodes. The multi-layer feedforward network extends the single-layer feedforward 
network through the addition of one or more hidden layers in the network. The NN used 
in this thesis consists of one hidden layer and one output layer. The hidden layer creates 
an additional set of synaptic connections between the input nodes and output layer of 
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neurons, which allows the derivation of higher-order statistics and relationships; this is 
especially important in applications where the inputs have large dimensions. 
Each neuron in its respective layer is connected to every other node in the 
adjacent forward layer. The number of neurons in the single hidden layer is derived based 
on a rule-of-thumb from [22], where the number of neurons is the sum of two-thirds the 
number of features and the number of outcome types. If the value calculated is a decimal 
number, the decimal number is rounded up. 
The NN output ky  can be mathematically described as [23] 
 
1 1
( ) [ ( ( ))]
H I
k s kh sh hi i
h i
y l f w f w x l
= =
= ∑ ∑   (4) 
where k  is the respective outcome type, ix  is the input, i  is the respective feature of the 
input, I  represents the total number of features per input sample and the sample number 
of the input is l  . The total number of hidden layers is H , and h  represents the 
respective hidden layer. The weights from neuron i  to neuron h  and the weights from 
neuron h  to neuron k  are, respectively, defined as hiw  and khw . The hidden layer 
activation function and the output layer activation function are defined, respectively, as 










where z  is the input to the activation function. The output layer activation function sf  














  (6) 
where K  is the total number of outcome types. 
The reader can also refer to [17] for further details on the multi-layer feedforward 
NN. 
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2. Single NN Classification Module 
The NN is trained using 25,192 training samples. The IDS must classify each 
network event as one of the five known outcome types or an unknown type. The NN 
chosen for this module has the characteristics discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The NN has a single hidden layer, and the MATLAB “patternnet” function was 
used to create the NN. For the scenarios in Section III, the number of neurons in the 
hidden layer is described as follows. In the baseline scenario without feature-extraction, 
the hidden layer uses 33 neurons, which is calculated based on 2/3(41) + 5 (41 input 
features and five NN outcome types). In the scenario utilizing feature-extraction, the 
hidden layer uses 27 neurons, which is calculated based on 2/3(33) + 5 (33 input features 
and five NN outcome types). 
The NN utilizes a supervised learning approach with the training function as 
scaled conjugate gradient and the performance function as cross-entropy. The training 
proportion of the training dataset is 90%, and the validation proportion of the training 
dataset is 10%. The division of the training dataset into training and validation sets was 
performed randomly. A separate test dataset was used to test the NN. 
The NN takes in two input matrices at the training stage: a training feature matrix 
that contains the feature vectors and a training outcome matrix that indicates the 
respective output type for every feature vector.  
For every test input to the NN, the NN outputs a vector of five numbers, where 
each element represents one of the five known outcome types. The maximum value of 
any element is one, and the output of the NN is indicated by the element with the 
maximum value.  
As a result of the supervised learning approach implemented, the NN is unable to 
classify unknown events type in the test dataset as unknown; thus, an additional 
capability was included to classify unknown output types. First, a sixth element was 
added to the NN output vector as a placeholder for the unknown outcome type. The 
unknown type was determined through the use of a threshold value; if the maximum 
output value of the NN is below the empirical threshold value of 0.8, this means that the 
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NN is not able to match its output with one of the known output types with high 
confidence. In this case, the NN output defaults to the unknown type.  
3. Three-Parallel NN Classification Module  
The next architecture is comprised of three separate NN modules, where each NN 
is trained using 1/3 of the 25,192 training samples. Each NN has the same properties as 
those described in Section 2. 
The training set used for each NN is exclusive, and the three NNs work in 
parallel. To classify unknown event types, the output of each NN is subjected to the same 
processing as described in Section 2.  
Separate outputs are combined based on the number of samples within the 
training set of the respective NNs. If no training samples of an outcome type are used to 
train a NN, that respective NN is given a weight of zero in influencing the joint decision 
of the three NNs. Conversely, if all training samples of an outcome type are used to train 
a NN, that NN has a maximum weight of one in influencing the joint decision of the three 
NNs and the other two NNs have no influence on the joint decision. 
The weight used for each of the smaller NN module is calculated based on the 
following:  
• For each NN, the number of training samples per outcome type is 
tabulated as , where  represents one of the three NNs and  represents 
an outcome type. 
• The total number of training samples per outcome type in the full training 
set is tabulated as , where  represents a specific outcome type.  
• The weight applied to each outcome type for the respective NN is , 
where  represents one of the three NNs and  represents one outcome 
type. The respective weight is calculated by . 
• For unknown outcome types, the default weight is the inverse of the 
number of NNs used in decision fusion process, i.e. 1/3. 
The output of a respective NN for a particular outcome type is , where  
represents one of the three NNs and  represents an outcome type. The outputs of each 
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NN are then multiplied by the respective weights and summed together to create the final 









=∑  . (7) 
Similarly to the single NN architecture, the final NN output is indicated by the 
element with the highest value in the output vector. 
The IDS implementation and performance is discussed in the next chapter. 
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III. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Simulation results obtained for the IDS architectures are discussed in this chapter; 
the PCC and timing results obtained for the respective scenarios are presented in Sections 
A and B, and a discussion of the results is given in Section C. To allow comparison and 
benchmarking of results, all experiments were performed on a MacBook Pro (Retina, 15-
inch, Early 2013) with 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 Processor that was installed with 16 GB 
16000 MHz DDR3 Random Access Memory (RAM), and the Operating System used 
was MAC OS X Yosemite (Version 10.10.3). The MATLAB version used was 2014b. 
A. BASELINE CLASSIFIER WITHOUT FEATURE EXTRACTION 
This scenario was conducted as a baseline for comparison.  
The feature-extraction stage is bypassed, and all 41 features were used to train and test 
the NN. 
The same pattern recognition feedforward NN structure was used for the single 
NN and the three-parallel NN implementation. The NN uses 41 inputs, 33 hidden neurons 
and five neurons for the output layer. The training samples have five different outcome 
types, which results in five output neurons. The sixth “unknown” type output is 
determined by the logic as described earlier in Section II.E.2. An illustration of the NN 
implemented in MATLAB is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Forty-one input pattern recognition feed-forward NN structure. 
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1. Probability of Correct Classification Results 
Each NN was tested individually with the test dataset. The single NN output was 
compared with the desired outcome via the “plotconfusion” function provided by 
MATLAB; detailed confusion matrix results are shown in Appendix E. For the respective 
three-parallel NN classification module, each parallel NN output and the merged output 
of the three NNs were compared with the desired outcome via the same method. PCC 
results are shown in Table 3. Due to the use of random seeds in the training process of the 
NN, the PCC results vary slightly, but results shown here are representative of the NN 
average classification performance. 
 PCC for baseline scenario on test dataset. 
NN Type PCC (%) 
DOS U2R R2L Probe Normal Unknown 
Sub NN #1 91.0 0.0 0.9 72.6 95.6 34.9 
Sub NN #2 93.5 0.0 0.1 73.9 96.6 24.2 




93.2 0.0 0.4 73.5 96.5 20.8 
Single 91.8 0.0 0.0 73.0 95.8 27.5 
 
2. Timing Results 
To measure the amount of time taken to train the respective NN, 30 runs were 
conducted to find the mean-training time and associated standard deviation for the 
respective NN implementations. It is also noted that the time taken by the NN to produce 
the output from the test dataset is almost negligible; for a test dataset of 22,543 samples, 
the NN takes less than one second to produce the output. Training times for the respective 
NNs are presented in Table 4. It is also observed that MATLAB has sufficient RAM to 
execute each simulation run without impacting timing measurements. 
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 NN training execution time (average over 30 Runs) – baseline 
scenario. 
NN Type Average (seconds) Standard Deviation 
(Seconds) 
  
Sub NN #1 2.8092 0.6242 
Sub NN #2 2.5920 0.7613 
Sub NN #3 2.5597 0.7307 
Total time for three-parallel NN 
Implementation (Sequential) 
7.9609 2.1162 
Single 10.8496 3.636 
 
B. REDUCED FEATURE SIZE CLASSIFIER IMPLEMENTATION 
The effects of feature-extraction on classifier performance and the results 
compared with those from the baseline scenario are considered in this scenario. Recall, 
the feature-extraction stage keeps only 33 of the 41 original features. 
The same pattern recognition feedforward NN structure was used for the single 
NN and the three-parallel NN implementations. The NN uses 33 inputs, 27 hidden 
neurons and five neurons for the output layer. The training samples have five different 
outcome types, which results in five output neurons. The sixth “unknown” type output is 
determined by the logic as described in Section II.E.2. An illustration of the NN 
implemented in MATLAB is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Thirty-three input pattern recognition feed-forward NN structure. 
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1. Probability of Correct Classification Results 
Similar to the baseline scenario, each NN was tested individually with the test 
dataset using the same methods as described earlier; detailed confusion matrix results are 
shown in Appendix F. The PCC results are presented in Table 5. Due to the use of 
random seeds in the training process of the NN, the PCC results vary slightly, but results 
shown here are representative of the NN average classification performance. 
 PCC for reduced feature size classifier on test dataset. 
NN Type PCC (%) 
DOS U2R R2L Probe Normal Unknown 
Sub NN #1 91.4 2.7 0.0 71.8 95.0 14.8 
Sub NN #2 92.0 0.0 0.0 73.9 96.1 24.1 




91.9 0.0 0.0 73.1 96.1 25.2 
Single 94.2 0.0 0.2 73.9 96.9 17.3 
 
2. Timing Results 
Similar to the baseline scenario, training times for the respective NNs are shown 
in Table 6. To get the reduction in average training time in Table 6, the new average 
training time is divided by the baseline average training time to get the percentage 
equivalent. The reduction percentage is then obtained by subtracting this value from 
100%. It is also observed that MATLAB has sufficient RAM to execute each simulation 





 NN training execution time (average over 30 runs) – reduced 
feature size scenario. 





Percentage Reduction in Average 
Training Time as compared to 
Baseline Scenario (%) 
   
Sub NN #1 2.1874 0.6282 22.2 
Sub NN #2 1.8743 0.4059 27.6 
Sub NN #3 2.0267 0.5745 20.82 
Total time for three-parallel 
NN Implementation 
(Sequential) 
6.0884 1.6086 23.5 
Single 8.6757 2.4317 20 
 
C. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Results obtained in this study raise the following discussion points. 
1. Feature Extraction Impacts on Training-Stage Execution Time 
Reducing the feature size does not degrade classification performances in either 
NN implementation; the feature-extraction stage successfully removed irrelevant features 
which did not serve to improve the NN classification capabilities. 
The main benefit is a reduction in the training time for both NN implementations, 
as shown in Table 6. This characteristic is beneficial when there is a need to retrain NNs 
with new network data while minimizing disruption to real-time detection of network 
intrusions.  
2. Comparison of NN Implementations 
The overall training time is shorter for the three-parallel NN implementation, and 
the three-parallel NN implementation has comparable PCC performance to the single NN 
implementation. This is seen in Table 4 and Table 6, where the overall training time is 
shorter than that required for the single NN implementation, when all three sub NNs are 
trained sequentially.  
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The training time for the three-parallel NN implementation can be further 
improved when three parallel computing threads are used to train each sub NN. In such a 
case, the total training time is based on that obtained for the sub NN with the longest 
training time.  
The retraining time for the three-parallel NN implementation can improve further 
if the feature-extraction stage determines that new training data uses the same set of 
features as the original training data. In this case, a three-parallel NN only needs to train 
one sub NN with the latest network data and replace either the oldest or worst performing 
sub NN. In comparison, a single NN implementation needs to retrain the whole NN with 
the old and new data. 
3. Effects of the Training Dataset 
Results show that U2R and R2L outcome types have low PCC for both NN 
implementations. U2R and R2L outcome types have fewer training samples than DOS, 
Probe and Normal training samples, as seen from Table 1. As a result, the training dataset 
is imbalanced, which may have led to insufficient training of the NN in classifying the 
U2R and R2L outcome types in the testing database. 
Classification results obtained for DOS, Probe and Normal outcome types are 
better. This is due to the large number of training samples for the DOS, Probe and 
Normal outcome types, which allows the NN to be sufficiently trained. 
The use of the threshold method as described in Section II.E.2 to determine 
unknown outcome types is only able to generate approximately 20% PCC. It is noted that 
the threshold can be set higher to allow more unknown events to be classified 
successfully; a higher threshold that the NN output needs to be larger to be classified as 
one of the five known outcome types. This also comes with the downside of having more 
of the known outcome types being classified as unknown outcome types.  
Results obtained with the NN based classifier considered in this study were 
presented in this section. Conclusions and recommendations for future work are provided 
in the next chapter. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions and recommendations for future work are given in this chapter. 
The main purpose of this thesis was to develop an NN-based supervised IDS. The 
IDS considered contains three interchangeable modular software components. The first 
module pre-processes the raw training and testing data, the second module applies 
feature-extraction, and the last module performs the NN training and the classification of 
network events. Single NN and three-parallel NN implementations were developed in the 
classification module for comparison of PCC and timing performances. 
The performance of the IDS implementation was tested using the KDD Cup 99 
dataset using separate testing and training sets. Simulations were conducted to investigate 
the effects of feature-extraction and compute performances obtained with the single NN 
and three-parallel NN implementations. 
Results show the feature-extraction stage removes irrelevant features without 
impacting PCC while reducing the training time.  
While the three-parallel NN implementation is comparable in PCC performance 
to the single NN implementation, it was shown to be superior in terms of training time. 
This makes the three-parallel NN implementation a possible candidate for use in real-
time applications, when the IDS needs to frequently retrain to handle new types of 
network attacks. 
The following areas are recommended for further work. 
Further analysis of the histogram obtained for each feature on a per outcome basis 
can be performed and used for additional processing in the feature-extraction module. 
The IDS considered in this thesis is a signature-based IDS, which detects network 
attacks or intrusions through patterns in the features. Other approaches such as anomaly-
based IDS can be considered to complement signature based IDS, as suggested in [24], 
where anomaly-based IDS are used to detect behavioral deviations from normal network 
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behavior. Future projects may include the development of a separate anomaly-based IDS 
to complement the results of the IDS considered in this study. 
The IDS can be configured based on the number of sub-NNs present in a parallel 
NN implementation, threshold values to remove unneeded features, number of neurons in 
the hidden layer, number of hidden layers, testing-to-validation ratio used for NN training 
and threshold values to determine unknown outcome types; thus, future work should 
consider optimizing these parameters. 
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APPENDIX B. FEATURES LIST FOR KDD CUP DATA 
S/N Name Type 
1 duration continuous 
2 protocol_type symbolic 
3 service symbolic 
4 flag symbolic 
5 src_bytes continuous 
6 dst_bytes continuous 
7 land continuous 
8 wrong_fragment continuous 
9 urgent continuous 
10 hot continuous 
11 num_failed_logins continuous 
12 logged_in continuous 
13 num_compromised continuous 
14 root_shell continuous 
15 su_attempted continuous 
16 num_root continuous 
17 num_file_creations continuous 
18 num_shells continuous 
19 num_access_files continuous 
20 num_outbound_cmds continuous 
21 is_host_login continuous 
22 is_guest_login continuous 
23 count continuous 
24 srv_count continuous 
25 serror_rate continuous 
26 srv_serror_rate continuous 
27 rerror_rate continuous 
28 srv_rerror_rate continuous 
29 same_srv_rate continuous 
30 diff_srv_rate continuous 
31 srv_diff_host_rate continuous 
32 dst_host_count continuous 
33 dst_host_srv_count continuous 
34 dst_host_same_srv_rate continuous 
35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate continuous 
36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate continuous 
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37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate continuous 
38 dst_host_serror_rate continuous 
39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate continuous 
40 dst_host_rerror_rate continuous 




APPENDIX C. ENUMERATION USED FOR SYMBOLIC 
FEATURES 
Enumeration Types for “protocol_type” 





Enumeration Types for “service” 







































































Enumeration Types for “flag” 
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APPENDIX D. HISTOGRAM OF FEATURES PER OUTCOME 
TYPE 
 


















Figure 11.  Features of KDD cup 99 data for normal; histogram of features values. 
 40 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41 
APPENDIX E. CONFUSION MATRIX RESULTS FOR BASELINE 
SCENARIO WITHOUT FEATURE EXTRACTION 
The lowest horizontal row of the confusion matrix indicates the percentage of the 
respective outcome class which was correctly classified for the test dataset. The rightmost 
vertical column indicates the probability that a given output of an outcome type is correct 
(True Positive). The diagonal of the matrix indicates the proportion of the respective 
outcome type in the full testing set. The cell in the rightmost column and the bottom row 
indicates the overall PCC regardless of outcome type. 
 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 47 
APPENDIX F. CONFUSION MATRIX RESULTS FOR SCENARIO 
UTILIZING FEATURE EXTRACTION 
The lowest horizontal row of the confusion matrix indicates the percentage of the 
respective outcome class which was correctly classified for the test dataset. The rightmost 
vertical column indicates the probability that a given output of an outcome type is correct 
(True Positive). The diagonal of the matrix indicates the proportion of the respective 
outcome type in the full testing set. The cell in the rightmost column and the bottom row 
indicates the overall PCC regardless of outcome type. 
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